The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan. (Global Insights)

In adapting to the challenges of the. 200 1-2002 war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the international humanitarian system has experienced an identity crisis. (1) Humanitarian principles clash with organizational considerations. A conventional interpretation of humanitarian principles and law would posit that the primary duty bearers for providing emergency relief should be the warring parties themselves, with the international humanitarian system providing secondary support on a neutral and impartial basis. Instead, in Afghanistan, the international relief agencies have successfully advocated for an outside monopoly over the provision of relief aid in spite of the insecurity and remoteness of much of the country. The constraints facing the relief agencies have been partly logistical and, for the United Nations (UN) system and many international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), partly due to threats to the security of field staff posed by their non-neutral status. While the coalition forces had the me ans to overcome the former problem, and the delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were not compromised with regard to the latter, neither of these respective institutional advantages translated into the major relief programs that both law and politics would indicate. As the evidence emerges of the high human costs associated with the failure of the international community to provide timely and adequate relief aid in certain contested and inaccessible areas of Afghanistan, (2) the causes of this lamentable state of affairs need to be understood. The position widely held among UN and international NGO staff is explained by Jean Ziegler, UN special rapporteur on the Right to Food, who in November 2001 wrote: Food by military forces compromise the credibility of humanitarian aid, which in its essence must be neutral, universal and respond to the needs of suffering people. It is very dangerous to confuse humanitarian and military objectives. This compromises the key principles of humanitarian organizations and international law. This is putting at risk humanitarian personnel and failing to protect the neutrality and credibility of humanitarian aid. (3) An open letter from a group of U.S. agencies to Zeigler extended the argument: The seminal principle of humanitarian relief is that, military operations should be clearly distinct from humanitarian activities. Particularly at the height of hostilities, military forces should not be directly involved in humanitarian action, as this would or could, in the minds of the authorities and the population, associate humanitarian organizations with political or military objectives that go beyond humanitarian concerns. (4) This proposition, in various forms, was articulated with great effect by numerous NGOs and UN agencies in response to the U.S. snow drops of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs). The U.S. consortium Inter Action believes that the argument persuaded the U.S. secretary of defense to backpedal on his alleged intention to break the humanitarian impasse in Afghanistan during the difficult days of November 2001 through employing military assets. The argument is based on the fallacious proposition that humanitarian action is the exclusive province of civilian humanitarian agencies. On the contrary, international humanitarian law (IHL) recognizes humanitarian roles that are routinely undertaken by military personnel. Medical staff, stretcher bearers, and ambulance drivers are able to wear and enjoy the protection of the Red Cross emblem, which is available to neither the NGOs nor the UN. (5) The nature of the activity rather than the institutional identity of the actor defines humanitarian action. Illustratively, warring parties have a duty to respect the humanitarian principle that the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited (6) and to facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage for all relief consignments and personnel. …