Ordinary language philosophy : a critical re-examination

This dissertation argues that ordinary language analysis offers a means of critically evaluating substantive philosophical claims as well as providing a tool for constructing answers to philosophical conundrums. It has been neglected due to some powerful, though ultimately misguided, objections. Those who called themselves ordinary language philosophers did not effectively explain or defend their methodology and thus these objections were never adequately met. This dissertation articulates and defends the methodology and its core theoretical commitments. Ordinary language philosophy is essentially an empirical investigation into how words are used in ordinary (non-philosophical) contexts. Some believed that we could eliminate philosophical conundrums via such analysis. Wittgenstein, for example, thought that most philosophical problems were caused by linguistic confusion. I argue that the methodology does have an important critical role to play, but I also believe that it can be an important tool in constructing genuine solutions to problems. There are different sets of objections to ordinary language analysis corresponding to two different parts of the analysis. One set of objects concern the empirical inquiry into how words are used in ordinary contexts. Primary among them is the concern that, because it relies upon the linguistic intuitions of a single philosopher, the process is too idiosyncratic. My methodology (derived from J. L. Austin's work) achieves objectivity by expanding the pool of people who are consulted and by actually looking at real cases (by, for example, reading the relevant literature) in which the terms and idioms under consideration are used. Native speakers are experts in using these terms and idioms, so, if we expand the pool of speakers enough, we should achieve an adequate picture of how and under what circumstances the relevant terms are used. Another set of objections concern what I call the philosophical part of ordinary language analysis. Among them are concerns that it is committed to the allegedly repudiated notion of the analytic/synthetic distinction; concerns that since meanings are constantly changing, information about meaning is irrelevant to philosophical investigation; and concerns connected to Grice's work on conversational implicature. I discuss each objection and demonstrate how it can be overcome