Epistemic pragmatism and the problem of relativism

This chapter makes a comparison between the epistemic concepts employed by the analytic epistemology tradition and the Yorùbá tradition. Against epistemology’s aim of establishing single conditions for knowledge, this chapter posits a pragmatic approach to the evaluation of epistemic concepts as more relevant to our lived experience within a cultural norm. Whilst the Yorùbá tradition gives higher status to beliefs derived directly from sense perception, analytic epistemology gives a higher status to beliefs derived from testimony and reason. It is established that both cognitive processes adequately correspond to a reality leading to successful action and social outcome, within differing cultural and environmental contexts. Consideration is also given to the relationship between the actions on an individual level and the actions of a society as a whole, particularly the economic activity of a society and how this influences the epistemic cognitive processes utilized. It is suggested that the labels such as “truth” of the epistemic cognitive processes in the two traditions have an instrumental value and tool-like function in relation to an emergent desired action and outcome in wider cultural and environmental context, rather than intrinsic value. It is evaluation of the effectiveness of the epistemic cognitive processes in achieving the desired outcomes with corresponding contexts, which provides an assessment framework.