Popper versus analytical philosophy?: Jeremy Shearmur

While Popper could be seen as an analytical philosopher, his work has not – a few points aside – had the sort of role in the development of contemporary analytical philosophy that has, say, that of Carnap or of Quine. This chapter argues that there is, indeed, something distinctive about Popper’s approach, something which may usefully be contrasted with ideas that are widely accepted within contemporary analytical philosophy. It discusses the assumption within analytical philosophy that underlying ordinary claims about knowledge there is some true logical form which represents the ‘correct’ way of representing and analysing things, Popper’s view of the significance of scientific knowledge for epistemology, and Popper’s arguments for the importance of attempting scientific reduction but against the assumption that naturalism must be correct. The latter are extended into an argument against the presumption of naturalism in ethics. More generally, the chapter argues for Popper’s view that truth is more likely to emerge from the contention of substantive, competing viewpoints rather than from allegedly neutral ‘analysis’ – and that we would benefit from an engagement with Popper’s distinctive perspective, even if in the end it should turn out to be incorrect.