2004Unpublished venueRequires access

What's a JIC to Do?

Mary Ellen Quinn

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Abstract

Abstract : Under current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. If current proposals to change the programs for shared production and federated intelligence, are enacted, in the event of a crisis, the command joint intelligence centers will lose an important capability to leverage intelligence assets in support of Joint Force commanders. Restructuring the shared production program from its origins in the Cold War, with the primary emphasis on enemy order of battle, to a program flexible enough to meet the needs of Combatant Commands facing a variety of asymmetric threats makes sense. Taking the next step towards abandoning all scheduled intelligence production is short sighted at best and potentially dangerous to U.S. forces. As a nation with global interests and alliances, we cannot predict where the next hot spot will emerge therefore there will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products addressing military geography, cultural intelligence, etc. to support planners and operational forces. Without established relationships and oversight, the federated intelligence process activated to support commands in a crisis is destined to waste time and resources. Finally, if support for shared production and federation is not forthcoming from the national level, additional resources need to be provided to the Command J2s in order for them to develop their capabilities internally.

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What this paper is about

Abstract : Under current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. If current proposals to change the programs for shared production and federated intelligence, are enacted, in the event of a crisis, the command joint intelligence centers will lose an important capability to leverage intelligence assets in support of Joint Force commanders. Restructuring the shared production program from its origins in the Cold War, with the primary emphasis on enemy order of battle, to a program flexible enough to meet the needs of Combatant Commands facing a variety of asymmetric threats makes sense. Taking the next step towards abandoning all scheduled intelligence production is short sighted at best and potentially dangerous to U.S. forces. As a nation with global interests and alliances, we cannot predict where the next hot spot will emerge therefore there will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products addressing military geography, cultural intelligence, etc. to support planners and operational forces. Without established relationships and oversight, the federated intelligence process activated to support commands in a crisis is destined to waste time and resources. Finally, if support for shared production and federation is not forthcoming from the national level, additional resources need to be provided to the Command J2s in order for them to develop their capabilities internally.

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Available abstract

Abstract : Under current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. If current proposals to change the programs for shared production and federated intelligence, are enacted, in the event of a crisis, the command joint intelligence centers will lose an important capability to leverage intelligence assets in support of Joint Force commanders. Restructuring the shared production program from its origins in the Cold War, with the primary emphasis on enemy order of battle, to a program flexible enough to meet the needs of Combatant Commands facing a variety of asymmetric threats makes sense. Taking the next step towards abandoning all scheduled intelligence production is short sighted at best and potentially dangerous to U.S. forces. As a nation with global interests and alliances, we cannot predict where the next hot spot will emerge therefore there will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products addressing military geography, cultural intelligence, etc. to support planners and operational forces. Without established relationships and oversight, the federated intelligence process activated to support commands in a crisis is destined to waste time and resources. Finally, if support for shared production and federation is not forthcoming from the national level, additional resources need to be provided to the Command J2s in order for them to develop their capabilities internally.

Key concepts: Computer science

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