Common Good Originalism: Our Tradition and Our Path Forward
Josh Hammer
Abstract
Josh Hammer
Abstract
For far too long, originalist scholarship and taxonomy has been divided between libertarian progressive and originalism. But so-called originalism, as it has usually been historically formulated, is usually avowedly positivist and rooted in Thayerian deference or other proceduralist norms of judicial restraint. This paper argues that this is wrong. Just as libertarian originalism and progressive originalism entail an inherent element of substance, so too can a genuinely, substantively conservative strand of originalist jurisprudence be theorized. In fact, this paper argues, such a strand of originalism is our true Anglo-American constitutional inheritance: common good originalism.
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For far too long, originalist scholarship and taxonomy has been divided between libertarian progressive and originalism. But so-called originalism, as it has usually been historically formulated, is usually avowedly positivist and rooted in Thayerian deference or other proceduralist norms of judicial restraint. This paper argues that this is wrong. Just as libertarian originalism and progressive originalism entail an inherent element of substance, so too can a genuinely, substantively conservative strand of originalist jurisprudence be theorized. In fact, this paper argues, such a strand of originalism is our true Anglo-American constitutional inheritance: common good originalism.
Key concepts: Originalism, Law, Original meaning, Jurisprudence, Proposition, Scholarship, Political science, Constitution