THE NON-COOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE GAME MODELS BUILT FOR THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING METHODS IN AN INNOVATIVE WAY UNDER GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

The research object in this paper is the water diversion project supply chain which consists of a water transfer corporation and a water work. The existing status of Russia's water delivery infrastructure, emphasizing that a large portion, and replaced to avoid potentially dangerous effects. The non-cooperative and cooperative game models of under government subsidies are developed by using the financial accounting approach in a creative way. The impact of various levels and trends of government subsidies on water availability, pricing, and benefit sharing were then correlated and studied. The results show that as the number of subsidies rose, so did the optimum amount of water supply and income, but the cost of water work decreased. The Volga River Water Diversion Project, located in the southwest of the country, is examined to demonstrate the effectiveness of this model. The price of the water plant remained constant while the volume of subsidy remained constant. The price of the water transfer firm, on the other hand, is continually changing; the lower the price, the greater the proportion of subsidies it got.