2020•Unpublished venueRequires access

Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism

John Turri

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.

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What this paper is about

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.

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OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.

Key concepts: Contextualism, Assertion, Epistemology, Philosophy, Linguistics, Computer science, Programming language, Interpretation (philosophy)

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