Military Theory and Information Warfare
Ryan Henry, C. Edward Peartree
Abstract
Open-access reader
Ryan Henry, C. Edward Peartree
Abstract
Open-access reader
To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose."--Giulio Douhet [1] The effect of technology on warfare often has colored the predictions of theorists, elevating to eternal truths what we discover in retrospect to have been passing historical epochs.Free of the context of the 1920s, Douhet seems dazzled by the revolutionary possibilities of air power.He cannot be criticized for not anticipating anti-aircraft radar and surface-to-air missiles, nor were he and his contemporaries alert to the continued success of low-tech, ground-based asymmetric strategies of determined, resilient adversaries.But one word--Vietnam--provides a corrective to his assertions.Air power has had a tremendous effect on warfare, but it simply has not lived up to Douhet's prediction that it would be the decisive factor in all future conflicts.Current interest in information warfare and the manifold effects of the information revolution on the conduct of war cause many to proclaim a revolution in warfare.Evangelists of information warfare, like forerunner evangelists of air power, sea power, and artillery, risk losing sight of historical context and the continuities of conflict.We are once again faced with a genuine technological revolution which seems to offer an entirely new mode of warfare, one that advocates insist will supplant existing modes.Thus military theorists and defense planners are once again challenged to use new technologies for the competitive advantages they may offer on the battlefield, while bearing in mind their limitations.This article reviews the effects of information technologies on military theory, tempered by insights into the consequences of previous technological revolutions.Issues emerge that are independent of any technology or international security environment.They include an appraisal of the ability of contemporary analysts and theorists to challenge promises of unprecedented change, and an examination of the theoretical implications of the so-called "revolution in military affairs."Related issues include the need to avoid being dazzled by the new technologies (while not exaggerating their significance) and at the same time appreciating the extraordinary near-term advantages and capabilities they afford.Finally there is the matter of balance.We must use the technologies to advantage, neither misapplying them in haste nor hesitating until we miss the opportunities they represent.
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To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose."--Giulio Douhet [1] The effect of technology on warfare often has colored the predictions of theorists, elevating to eternal truths what we discover in retrospect to have been passing historical epochs.Free of the context of the 1920s, Douhet seems dazzled by the revolutionary possibilities of air power.He cannot be criticized for not anticipating anti-aircraft radar and surface-to-air missiles, nor were he and his contemporaries alert to the continued success of low-tech, ground-based asymmetric strategies of determined, resilient adversaries.But one word--Vietnam--provides a corrective to his assertions.Air power has had a tremendous effect on warfare, but it simply has not lived up to Douhet's prediction that it would be the decisive factor in all future conflicts.Current interest in information warfare and the manifold effects of the information revolution on the conduct of war cause many to proclaim a revolution in warfare.Evangelists of information warfare, like forerunner evangelists of air power, sea power, and artillery, risk losing sight of historical context and the continuities of conflict.We are once again faced with a genuine technological revolution which seems to offer an entirely new mode of warfare, one that advocates insist will supplant existing modes.Thus military theorists and defense planners are once again challenged to use new technologies for the competitive advantages they may offer on the battlefield, while bearing in mind their limitations.This article reviews the effects of information technologies on military theory, tempered by insights into the consequences of previous technological revolutions.Issues emerge that are independent of any technology or international security environment.They include an appraisal of the ability of contemporary analysts and theorists to challenge promises of unprecedented change, and an examination of the theoretical implications of the so-called "revolution in military affairs."Related issues include the need to avoid being dazzled by the new technologies (while not exaggerating their significance) and at the same time appreciating the extraordinary near-term advantages and capabilities they afford.Finally there is the matter of balance.We must use the technologies to advantage, neither misapplying them in haste nor hesitating until we miss the opportunities they represent.
Key concepts: Information warfare, Political science, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, Revolution in Military Affairs, Military science, Computer security, Criminology