Nett
Abstract
Lorenz Nett, The Role of Sunk Costs in Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Oligopolistic Market, Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, No. 33, Concurrence, entreprises publiques et coopératives / Competition and Non-Profit-Maximizing (Jan. - Mar., 1994), pp. 113-131
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Lorenz Nett, The Role of Sunk Costs in Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Oligopolistic Market, Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, No. 33, Concurrence, entreprises publiques et coopératives / Competition and Non-Profit-Maximizing (Jan. - Mar., 1994), pp. 113-131
Key concepts: Oligopoly, Sunk costs, Deterrence (psychology), Deterrence theory, Microeconomics, Economics, Business, Law and economics