Frankfurt on Identification and Satisfaction

In his seminal 1971 essay Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, \nHarry Frankfurt provides an insightful account of free will and the problem \nof determinism, that is not metaphysical, but rather psychological \nand practical. First and foremost, though, Frankfurt offers a philosophical \nanalysis of the nature of personhood. He does so by providing an alternative \nto the account of personhood advanced by Peter Strawson. In the \nStrawsonian view, a person is defined exclusively as a subject having both \nphysical and mental properties, so that the concept of a person can simply \nbe equated with the concept of a human being. Frankfurt argues against \nthis view, assuming that mere membership in the biological species homo \nsapiens is not sufficient enough to decide on the question of personhood. \nInstead, he claims that the essence of a person is to be found in the structure \nof the will.