Resource Curse, Institutions and Non-Resource Sector
Alexander Libman
Abstract
Open-access reader
Alexander Libman
Abstract
Open-access reader
This note presents a simple model of how resource rents can affect economic growth of a region of a centralized country, where sub-national governments have no authority over resource industries. The growth effect of resources appears to be conditional on the quality of institutions in the non-resource sector. Thus, even if the sub-national government does not affect the resource sector directly, the quality of institutions set by this government still influences whether resource boom has a positive or a negative effect on the economic growth.
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This note presents a simple model of how resource rents can affect economic growth of a region of a centralized country, where sub-national governments have no authority over resource industries. The growth effect of resources appears to be conditional on the quality of institutions in the non-resource sector. Thus, even if the sub-national government does not affect the resource sector directly, the quality of institutions set by this government still influences whether resource boom has a positive or a negative effect on the economic growth.
Key concepts: Resource curse, Economic rent, Boom, Resource (disambiguation), Government (linguistics), Business, Quality (philosophy), Resource productivity