The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof May Weaken the Presumption of Innocence
Stephen M. Sheppard
Abstract
Stephen M. Sheppard
Abstract
The standard of criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt is believed almost everywhere to be a bulwark of protection for the accused, an assurance that the state will not punish the innocent to snare more easily the guilty. This Article, presents a brief history of the reasonable doubt instruction. Historians have examined the origins of the doctrine, its antecedents in seventeenth-century England and its use in eighteenth-century common-law courts. The standard's evolution after 1850 and the significance of this later history upon the criminal law have remained largely unexamined. This Article seeks also to correct this omission.
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The standard of criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt is believed almost everywhere to be a bulwark of protection for the accused, an assurance that the state will not punish the innocent to snare more easily the guilty. This Article, presents a brief history of the reasonable doubt instruction. Historians have examined the origins of the doctrine, its antecedents in seventeenth-century England and its use in eighteenth-century common-law courts. The standard's evolution after 1850 and the significance of this later history upon the criminal law have remained largely unexamined. This Article seeks also to correct this omission.
Key concepts: Presumption of innocence, Burden of proof, Presumption, Reasonable doubt, Innocence, Law, Political science