2008Unpublished venueRequires access

Executive compensation

Ruth Bender, Keith Ward

Open publisher page 2,509 citations

Abstract

Many companies adopt a short-term bonus scheme for their executives, together with a longer term scheme which may be based on share options. The performance conditions attached to these schemes generally relate to accounting measures (for annual bonus schemes and share options) or to total shareholder return (TSR) (for other long-term incentive plans, ltips). However, accounting measures can bear little relation to the creation of shareholder value; and shareholder return is not necessarily related to management performance. Accordingly, performance measures need to be balanced carefully, to minimize distortion.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Many companies adopt a short-term bonus scheme for their executives, together with a longer term scheme which may be based on share options. The performance conditions attached to these schemes generally relate to accounting measures (for annual bonus schemes and share options) or to total shareholder return (TSR) (for other long-term incentive plans, ltips). However, accounting measures can bear little relation to the creation of shareholder value; and shareholder return is not necessarily related to management performance. Accordingly, performance measures need to be balanced carefully, to minimize distortion.

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Available abstract

Many companies adopt a short-term bonus scheme for their executives, together with a longer term scheme which may be based on share options. The performance conditions attached to these schemes generally relate to accounting measures (for annual bonus schemes and share options) or to total shareholder return (TSR) (for other long-term incentive plans, ltips). However, accounting measures can bear little relation to the creation of shareholder value; and shareholder return is not necessarily related to management performance. Accordingly, performance measures need to be balanced carefully, to minimize distortion.

Key concepts: Executive compensation, Psychology, Business, Compensation (psychology), Psychoanalysis

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