2021•Economic TheoryRequires access
Persuasion with costly precision
Arianna Degan, Ming Li
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Abstract
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Arianna Degan, Ming Li
Abstract
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OpenAlex reports 21 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
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Key concepts: Communication source, Discretion, Cheap talk, Persuasion, Stochastic game, Computer science, Lying, Private information retrieval