Husserl’s Model of Internal Time-consciousness

This chapter discusses the subjective character of time. E. Husserl begins by considering the views held on the subject of time-consciousness held by his teacher, the introspective psychologist and proto-phenomenologist, F. Brentano. Brentano has a model based on short-term memory: ‘hearing a continuous tone’ consists of forming associations between auditory input and inputs replayed from short-term memory. Husserl treats ‘retention’ and its future-oriented counterpart ‘protention’ not as fantasied memories or anticipations of other ‘nows’ associated with the present ‘now’, but as horizons of a temporally extended present. Husserl’s account of time-consdousness has exerdsed a major influence on subsequent developments in continental philosophy. Husserl’s ambition was to construct an epistemology and philosophy of science ‘without presuppositions’ and, as a prelude to constructing the ‘phenomenological philosophy’, including a notable account of the ‘psychology of internal time-consdousness’ certain of whose main themes the author shall summarize at this juncture.