Spinoza's Ontological Argument
Charles Jarrett
Abstract
Charles Jarrett
Abstract
In this paper I will suggest an interpretation of Spinoza's ontological argument on which (i) the argument, properly construed, is valid, and (ii) Spinoza, if granted the claim that it is possible that God exists, is successful in obtaining the conclusion of the argument. The interpretations given by H.A. Wolfson, G.H.R. Parkinson, and William A. Earle will then be argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds. Leibniz’ assessment of the argument, namely that it “permits us only to conclude that God's existence follows if his possibility is already proven,” is thus held to be correct.
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In this paper I will suggest an interpretation of Spinoza's ontological argument on which (i) the argument, properly construed, is valid, and (ii) Spinoza, if granted the claim that it is possible that God exists, is successful in obtaining the conclusion of the argument. The interpretations given by H.A. Wolfson, G.H.R. Parkinson, and William A. Earle will then be argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds. Leibniz’ assessment of the argument, namely that it “permits us only to conclude that God's existence follows if his possibility is already proven,” is thus held to be correct.
Key concepts: Argument (complex analysis), Philosophy, Ontological argument, Epistemology, Interpretation (philosophy), Argument map, Philosophy of religion, Linguistics