Hideshi Itoh
Abstract
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The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.
Key concepts: Moral hazard, Hierarchy, Incentive, Principal (computer security), Production (economics), Organizational architecture, Simple (philosophy), Knowledge management