Union-Firm Efficient Bagainig and Test of Oligopolistic Conduct
Jacques Bughin
Abstract
Jacques Bughin
Abstract
This paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination. Based on a translog function defined at the firm level, estimates for the Belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of output market power which is itself eroded by wage rents originating from efficient bargain.
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This paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination. Based on a translog function defined at the firm level, estimates for the Belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of output market power which is itself eroded by wage rents originating from efficient bargain.
Key concepts: Oligopoly, Economic rent, Wage, Economics, Market power, Bargaining power, Function (biology), Microeconomics