2005Econstor (Econstor)Open access

Efficiency wages and bargaining

Frank Walsh

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Abstract

I argue that in contrast to the literature to date efficiency wage and bargaining\nsolutions will typically be independent. If the bargained wage satisfies the efficiency\nwage constraint efficiency wages are irrelevant. If it does not, typically we have the efficiency wage solution and bargaining is irrelevant.

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I argue that in contrast to the literature to date efficiency wage and bargaining\nsolutions will typically be independent. If the bargained wage satisfies the efficiency\nwage constraint efficiency wages are irrelevant. If it does not, typically we have the efficiency wage solution and bargaining is irrelevant.

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Available abstract

I argue that in contrast to the literature to date efficiency wage and bargaining\nsolutions will typically be independent. If the bargained wage satisfies the efficiency\nwage constraint efficiency wages are irrelevant. If it does not, typically we have the efficiency wage solution and bargaining is irrelevant.

Key concepts: Wage bargaining, Efficiency wage, Economics, Wage, Labour economics, Constraint (computer-aided design), Contrast (vision), Microeconomics

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