The Increasingly Unflagging Obligation: Federal Jurisdiction after Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole

17 (2005) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994)).2. Colo.River Water Conservation Dist v. U S, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also Cohens v. Va., 19 U.S 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should ....We have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").3. It bears noting that there is something wholly unsatisfying about the statutory/ doctrinal distinction I draw in this Article Even for cases-such as Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005), and Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941 (2006)--where the interpretation of the diversity statute is at issue, the requirement of "complete" diversity animating both decisions is itself arguably doctrinal, read into § 1332's predecessor by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); so too, the federal question statute and the "well-pleaded complaint rule," per Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).Similarly, one might think of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the probate exception as both being predicated, to some degree, on statutory construction, the former on 28 U.S.C. § § 1257, 1331, and 1332, and the latter on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.4. The jurisdictional trend comes notwithstanding the general substantive hostility to litigation that some have found as a consistent pattern in the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.See