Taxes and unemployment
Rajit Biswas, Vandana Thandassery Ramakrishnan
Abstract
Rajit Biswas, Vandana Thandassery Ramakrishnan
Abstract
Abstract The present model revisits the issue of unit and ad valorem taxes in a model of monopolistic competition. It is shown that if the assumption of full employment is relaxed, then taxation can increase employment conditionally when the elasticity of substitution among varieties is low. Moreover, with the same level of initial unemployment, ad valorem tax is better than unit tax in terms of employment, when the targeted tax revenue is relatively high and scale economies are strong.
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Abstract The present model revisits the issue of unit and ad valorem taxes in a model of monopolistic competition. It is shown that if the assumption of full employment is relaxed, then taxation can increase employment conditionally when the elasticity of substitution among varieties is low. Moreover, with the same level of initial unemployment, ad valorem tax is better than unit tax in terms of employment, when the targeted tax revenue is relatively high and scale economies are strong.
Key concepts: Economics, Monopolistic competition, Unemployment, Ad valorem tax, Tax revenue, Elasticity of substitution, Revenue, Unit (ring theory)