Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and Public Law

Public choice theory plays a critical role in public law, particularly for legal scholarship and to some extent for doctrine.To be sure, it is not the only game in town, but it is an important one.We take broad views of both public choice and public law.Public choice theory, as the term is used in this volume, not only includes the classic application of economic principles to constitutional structure (as fi rst articulated by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) but also the overlapping categories of social choice, rational choice, and positive political theory.In short, public choice theory captures the application of basic economic principles -including rationality and self-interest of participating actors -to any public institution, whether formally political or not.Public law here is also used broadly.For our purposes, it encompasses most formal and informal interactions with governmental institutions, such as those between legislators, or between lobbyists and a federal agency.These interactions may be entirely among governmental actors or may include connections between the state and private individuals.This volume is part of a new series, Research Handbooks in Law and Economics, which has been developed under the direction of Judge Richard Posner and Professor Francesco Parisi.Each volume in the series aims to serve as a reference, providing helpful introductions to important topics, and as a provocateur, suggesting weaknesses and important areas for further exploration.This volume also emphasizes interdisciplinary and empirical approaches to public choice and public law, drawing from a range of social sciences and legal subjects.It is broken into four major segments: foundations, constitutional law and democracy, administrative design and action, and examples of specifi c statutory schemes.The contents are described in more detail below.This introductory essay has several goals and audiences.To situate the novice, it starts by providing some cursory background on public choice theory, which the fi rst part of the book covers in a more deliberate and stimulating manner.For the more sophisticated reader, it suggests that the fi eld has shifted considerably in its aims and even its methods, comparing its origins to its current manifestations.For scholars engaged in this or related research, it then off ers some lessons to consider as the fi eld moves forward.Finally, for all readers, it summarizes the chapters contained in the volume.One cautionary note should be made at the start.No component of the introduction or the book itself is meant to be all encompassing or conclusive.Rather, each hopefully stands as a helpful starting point to a much richer and more complex set of ideas in the extensive literature on public law and public choice.