Command and Control of the Division Rear Battle,

This study examines current US command and control doctrine for the division rear battle as presented in FM 90-14, Rear Battle. The adequacy of current division rear battle command and control doctrine is analyzed within the context of the AirLand Battlefield in light of the historical experiences of US armored divisions in World War II. The primary conclusion is that the principle of unity of effort, which FM 90-14 suggests is necessary in conducting the rear battle, and which was a critical factor in the successful conduct of the rear battle by US armored divisions in World War II, is missing in our current doctrine. The attempt by our current doctrine to integrate the division's rear security effort across organizational and functional boundaries is unrealistic. This has resulted in the establishment of confusing and redundant command and staff relationships involving, among others, the RAOC, G3, and rear battle officer. The primacy of command rather than control must be restored in our rear battle doctrine. In this regard, what is needed is a rear brigade equivalent commander along with his own headquarters and staff, analogous to the armored division trains commander of World War II. (Author)