Transfer Pricing and Partial Tax Harmonization
Wolfgang Eggert, Gideon Goerdt, Sebastian Heitzmann
Abstract
Open-access reader
Wolfgang Eggert, Gideon Goerdt, Sebastian Heitzmann
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper investigates regulation on corporate income taxation with multinationals and transfer pricing. We recommend full cooperation within the EU if profit shifting costs are sufficiently low and cannot be influenced to a large extend. Otherwise, high profit shifting costs or the potential to significantly influence them imply that partial cooperation is beneficial for all member states.
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This paper investigates regulation on corporate income taxation with multinationals and transfer pricing. We recommend full cooperation within the EU if profit shifting costs are sufficiently low and cannot be influenced to a large extend. Otherwise, high profit shifting costs or the potential to significantly influence them imply that partial cooperation is beneficial for all member states.
Key concepts: Transfer pricing, Harmonization, Profit (economics), Member states, Business, International taxation, International economics, Microeconomics