2014RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Comment

Eric Hoffmann, Tarun Sabarwal

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Abstract

In Karp et al. 2007 an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement

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What this paper is about

In Karp et al. 2007 an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement

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Available abstract

In Karp et al. 2007 an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement

Key concepts: Strategic complements, Argument (complex analysis), Statement (logic), Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Strategy, Economics, Game theory

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