A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Comment
Eric Hoffmann, Tarun Sabarwal
Abstract
Open-access reader
Eric Hoffmann, Tarun Sabarwal
Abstract
Open-access reader
In Karp et al. 2007 an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In Karp et al. 2007 an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement
Key concepts: Strategic complements, Argument (complex analysis), Statement (logic), Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Strategy, Economics, Game theory