Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for Group Members

Abstract If we are collectively morally responsible for some action, what does that say about me, and you, distinct individuals whose personal stories may differ widely? This essay probes this question, with special reference to collective moral blameworthiness. It gives an account of this in terms of collective action, collective moral knowledge, and collective freedom of action. It is argued that from collective moral blameworthiness one can infer nothing about the personal blameworthiness of any given member of the collective, whether or not he was a member of the collective at the time the action took place. At the same time, it is intelligible even for those who were not members at that time to acknowledge that “we” were to blame. Given these conclusions, those who consider taking steps against a blameworthy collective must do what they can to avoid harming innocent individuals.