Paola Manzini
Abstract
We build a simple allernating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players call commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
We build a simple allernating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players call commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.
Key concepts: Commit, Bargaining power, Wage bargaining, Bargaining problem, Wage, Economics, Microeconomics, Partition (number theory)