2010•The B E Journal of Theoretical EconomicsRequires access

A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs

Giuseppe Cappelletti

Abstract

Rationalizability is a widely accepted solution concept in the study of strategic-form games with complete information and is fully characterized in terms of assumptions on the rationality of the players and common certainty of rationality.Battigalli and Siniscalchi extend rationalizability taking as given some exogenous restrictions on players' beliefs and derive the solution concept called ?-rationalizability. This new solution concept has been applied to games with incomplete information as well as dynamic games.On this note, I focus on games with incomplete information and characterize ?-rationalizability with a new notion of iterative dominance that is able to capture the additional hypothesis on players' beliefs.

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Key concepts: Rationalizability, Rationality, Solution concept, Mathematical economics, Dominance (genetics), Complete information, Certainty, Economics