1998•World Bank, Washington, DC eBooksOpen access

Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse

Michael Klein

Abstract

International Economics and Trade-Access to Markets Urban Development-Municipal Financial Management Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Markets and Market Access International Terrorism and Counterterrorism Private Sector Development-Private Sector Economics Conflict and Development

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Key concepts: Winner's curse, Common value auction, Curse, Unique bid auction, Bid shading, Value (mathematics), Economics, Microeconomics

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