Teaching Critically within a Modern Legal Genre
William E. Conklin
Abstract
William E. Conklin
Abstract
This paper argues that the effort to teach law critically from the external viewpoint reinforces the ideological and social function of a professional law school in a modem state. One should realize that law is a language, a secondary language that conceals suffering as it parasitically assimilates all primary discourses. The professional law school of a modem state aids in the production of such concealment. Examples are offered from different areas of legal discourse as well as from the author's experiences. The suffering arises from the concealment of the languages of embodied subjects, whose harm can only be recognized through the chains of authoritative signifiers that the professor professes. The secondary legal language either excludes the primary languages or redefines the subject's experience. Further, the legal language is inculcated into the subject's language to the point that the citizen must identify with the secondary legal language or, if not, may be authoritatively enforced to do so. The second sense of suffering aggravates the first.
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This paper argues that the effort to teach law critically from the external viewpoint reinforces the ideological and social function of a professional law school in a modem state. One should realize that law is a language, a secondary language that conceals suffering as it parasitically assimilates all primary discourses. The professional law school of a modem state aids in the production of such concealment. Examples are offered from different areas of legal discourse as well as from the author's experiences. The suffering arises from the concealment of the languages of embodied subjects, whose harm can only be recognized through the chains of authoritative signifiers that the professor professes. The secondary legal language either excludes the primary languages or redefines the subject's experience. Further, the legal language is inculcated into the subject's language to the point that the citizen must identify with the secondary legal language or, if not, may be authoritatively enforced to do so. The second sense of suffering aggravates the first.
Key concepts: Embodied cognition, Harm, Ideology, Subject (documents), State (computer science), Sociology, Law, Function (biology)