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2003•The Economic JournalRequires access

Regulation with wage bargaining

Dag Morten Dalen, Nils‐Henrik M. von der Fehr, Espen R. Moen

Open publisher page 6 citations

Abstract

In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.

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What this paper is about

In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.

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Available abstract

In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.

Key concepts: Bargaining power, Wage bargaining, Economics, Wage, Incentive, Labour economics, Efficiency wage, Collective bargaining

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