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Constitutional Review Complaint as an Evolution of the Kelsenian Model

Jeong-In Yun

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Abstract

Abstract A centralized constitutional review system, generally known as the Austrian Constitutional Court model established in 1920 by Hans Kelsen, has spread globally after World War II and is now the most active constitutional tribunal in Europe. Interestingly, although the Constitutional Court of Korea was classified as this Kelsenian model, besides a typical kind of constitutional review procedure, the Court runs an additional procedure for the constitutional review of legislation. The latter has some comparatively special and unusual requirements and procedure, but the statistics indicate it has been actively used. It takes the form of a constitutional complaint, but in practice, it is treated as the second type of constitutional review of legislation in Korean constitutional adjudication. Through this special procedure, individuals appear to participate in a tripartite conversation on constitutional interpretation along with the judicial branch and the Constitutional Court. Moreover, to some extent, this sui generis complaint is perceived to make up for the prohibition of constitutional complaint on judgments of ordinary courts (‘Urteilsbeschwerde’) in Korea. In Austria, the individual complaint on constitutional review of statutes was introduced by a constitutional amendment in 2013, whereby the individual parties of the pending cases are entitled to file a constitutional review with the Constitutional Court as of 1 January 2015. In terms of enabling the individual party to request to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review of legislation, the Austrian new complaint is similar to the Korean one, but their requirements and procedures are different. From the perspective of enhanced individual access to the Constitutional Court, however, both complaints may be viewed as an evolution of the Kelsenian model to meet the demands of the times. In this regard, the Korean practice for over three decades may provide useful insights into the implementation of a new practice and further improvement in Austria. This article will examine the Korean ‘Constitutional Review Complaint’ and compare it with the Austrian ‘Gesetzesbeschwerde (Parteiantrag auf Normenkontrolle)’ to explore mutual references that will help improve both institutions. Then, I will assess what this kind of evolutionary invention of the constitutional review implies to the centennial of the Austrian model.

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Abstract A centralized constitutional review system, generally known as the Austrian Constitutional Court model established in 1920 by Hans Kelsen, has spread globally after World War II and is now the most active constitutional tribunal in Europe. Interestingly, although the Constitutional Court of Korea was classified as this Kelsenian model, besides a typical kind of constitutional review procedure, the Court runs an additional procedure for the constitutional review of legislation. The latter has some comparatively special and unusual requirements and procedure, but the statistics indicate it has been actively used. It takes the form of a constitutional complaint, but in practice, it is treated as the second type of constitutional review of legislation in Korean constitutional adjudication. Through this special procedure, individuals appear to participate in a tripartite conversation on constitutional interpretation along with the judicial branch and the Constitutional Court. Moreover, to some extent, this sui generis complaint is perceived to make up for the prohibition of constitutional complaint on judgments of ordinary courts (‘Urteilsbeschwerde’) in Korea. In Austria, the individual complaint on constitutional review of statutes was introduced by a constitutional amendment in 2013, whereby the individual parties of the pending cases are entitled to file a constitutional review with the Constitutional Court as of 1 January 2015. In terms of enabling the individual party to request to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review of legislation, the Austrian new complaint is similar to the Korean one, but their requirements and procedures are different. From the perspective of enhanced individual access to the Constitutional Court, however, both complaints may be viewed as an evolution of the Kelsenian model to meet the demands of the times. In this regard, the Korean practice for over three decades may provide useful insights into the implementation of a new practice and further improvement in Austria. This article will examine the Korean ‘Constitutional Review Complaint’ and compare it with the Austrian ‘Gesetzesbeschwerde (Parteiantrag auf Normenkontrolle)’ to explore mutual references that will help improve both institutions. Then, I will assess what this kind of evolutionary invention of the constitutional review implies to the centennial of the Austrian model.

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Available abstract

Abstract A centralized constitutional review system, generally known as the Austrian Constitutional Court model established in 1920 by Hans Kelsen, has spread globally after World War II and is now the most active constitutional tribunal in Europe. Interestingly, although the Constitutional Court of Korea was classified as this Kelsenian model, besides a typical kind of constitutional review procedure, the Court runs an additional procedure for the constitutional review of legislation. The latter has some comparatively special and unusual requirements and procedure, but the statistics indicate it has been actively used. It takes the form of a constitutional complaint, but in practice, it is treated as the second type of constitutional review of legislation in Korean constitutional adjudication. Through this special procedure, individuals appear to participate in a tripartite conversation on constitutional interpretation along with the judicial branch and the Constitutional Court. Moreover, to some extent, this sui generis complaint is perceived to make up for the prohibition of constitutional complaint on judgments of ordinary courts (‘Urteilsbeschwerde’) in Korea. In Austria, the individual complaint on constitutional review of statutes was introduced by a constitutional amendment in 2013, whereby the individual parties of the pending cases are entitled to file a constitutional review with the Constitutional Court as of 1 January 2015. In terms of enabling the individual party to request to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review of legislation, the Austrian new complaint is similar to the Korean one, but their requirements and procedures are different. From the perspective of enhanced individual access to the Constitutional Court, however, both complaints may be viewed as an evolution of the Kelsenian model to meet the demands of the times. In this regard, the Korean practice for over three decades may provide useful insights into the implementation of a new practice and further improvement in Austria. This article will examine the Korean ‘Constitutional Review Complaint’ and compare it with the Austrian ‘Gesetzesbeschwerde (Parteiantrag auf Normenkontrolle)’ to explore mutual references that will help improve both institutions. Then, I will assess what this kind of evolutionary invention of the constitutional review implies to the centennial of the Austrian model.

Key concepts: Constitutional court, Complaint, Law, Constitutional economics, Legislation, Political science, Constitutional review, Judicial review

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