2001•Unpublished venueRequires access

Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

Abstract

Abstract This chapter discusses the choice of economic instruments for environmental policy in the political economy framework of imperfect information and the need to provide incentives for political majorities. Models of command‐and‐control regulation and interest groups competition are presented. These models are then extended to study the impact of the dynamics of re‐election based on campaign contributions.

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Key concepts: Incentive, Politics, Imperfect, Perfect information, Competition (biology), Public economics, Economics, Political science