International Trade and the Incentive for Merger
Martin Chalkley, Geoff Stewart
Abstract
Open-access reader
Martin Chalkley, Geoff Stewart
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy. We fnd that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This paper examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy. We fnd that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Oligopoly, Duopoly, Profitability index, Incentive, Competition (biology), Economics, Bertrand competition