2004Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford)Open access

Auctions: Theory and Practice

Paul Klemperer

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Abstract

Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the application of auction theory to other areas of economics and, as a case study, evaluate the 2000-2001 third generation (3G) mobile phone license auctions in Europe. Includes an elementary, nontechnical survey of auction theory. Other papers discuss why every economist should learn some auction theory; what really matters in auction design; the use and abuse of auction theory; the 3G mobile-phone license auctions held in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark; how economists designed the U.K. 3G mobile-phone license auction; bidder strategies in the British and German 3G telecom auctions; and whether auctions were a good idea. Chapter one includes a set of exercises with solutions provided at the back of the book. Klemperer is the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society. Index.

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Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the application of auction theory to other areas of economics and, as a case study, evaluate the 2000-2001 third generation (3G) mobile phone license auctions in Europe. Includes an elementary, nontechnical survey of auction theory. Other papers discuss why every economist should learn some auction theory; what really matters in auction design; the use and abuse of auction theory; the 3G mobile-phone license auctions held in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark; how economists designed the U.K. 3G mobile-phone license auction; bidder strategies in the British and German 3G telecom auctions; and whether auctions were a good idea. Chapter one includes a set of exercises with solutions provided at the back of the book. Klemperer is the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society. Index.

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Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the application of auction theory to other areas of economics and, as a case study, evaluate the 2000-2001 third generation (3G) mobile phone license auctions in Europe. Includes an elementary, nontechnical survey of auction theory. Other papers discuss why every economist should learn some auction theory; what really matters in auction design; the use and abuse of auction theory; the 3G mobile-phone license auctions held in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark; how economists designed the U.K. 3G mobile-phone license auction; bidder strategies in the British and German 3G telecom auctions; and whether auctions were a good idea. Chapter one includes a set of exercises with solutions provided at the back of the book. Klemperer is the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society. Index.

Key concepts: Common value auction, Auction theory, Forward auction, Eauction, Computer science, Liberian dollar, License, Reverse auction

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