The Curious Case of Competition and Quality
Ariel Ezrachi, Maurice E. Stucke
Abstract
Open-access reader
Ariel Ezrachi, Maurice E. Stucke
Abstract
Open-access reader
Alongside the consideration of price, competition authorities recognize that quality can be as, if not more, important in some markets. But as competition authorities also recognize, identifying and measuring the dimensions of quality important to many consumers is challenging. To circumvent these challenges, competition authorities rely on several heuristics when assessing a merger’s, cartel’s or monopolistic restraint’s impact on quality. Often the heuristics work well for the competition authorities. In this article, we identify several scenarios where these heuristics break down, when competition and quality are not positively correlated, and when an increase in competition can actually reduce consumer welfare. We also identify two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that are common to every scenario. With these two conditions in mind, we provide instances when an increase in competition will not increase quality (when one would expect it should) or may even lead to quality degradation.
OpenAlex reports 32 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Alongside the consideration of price, competition authorities recognize that quality can be as, if not more, important in some markets. But as competition authorities also recognize, identifying and measuring the dimensions of quality important to many consumers is challenging. To circumvent these challenges, competition authorities rely on several heuristics when assessing a merger’s, cartel’s or monopolistic restraint’s impact on quality. Often the heuristics work well for the competition authorities. In this article, we identify several scenarios where these heuristics break down, when competition and quality are not positively correlated, and when an increase in competition can actually reduce consumer welfare. We also identify two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that are common to every scenario. With these two conditions in mind, we provide instances when an increase in competition will not increase quality (when one would expect it should) or may even lead to quality degradation.
Key concepts: Monopolistic competition, Competition (biology), Heuristics, Quality (philosophy), Cartel, Industrial organization, Business, Economics