Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Legal Analysis
W. Bradley Wendel
Abstract
Open-access reader
W. Bradley Wendel
Abstract
Open-access reader
For Dworkin's principal contributions to the metatheory of law, see generally RON- ALD DwOIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE] (critiquing legal positivism); RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) [hereinafter DWORIN, Hard Cases] (describing the questions judges must ask themselves in order to determine the rights of litigating parties in difficult cases).For a particularly clear state-2011
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For Dworkin's principal contributions to the metatheory of law, see generally RON- ALD DwOIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE] (critiquing legal positivism); RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) [hereinafter DWORIN, Hard Cases] (describing the questions judges must ask themselves in order to determine the rights of litigating parties in difficult cases).For a particularly clear state-2011
Key concepts: Doctrine, Argument (complex analysis), Law and economics, Legal doctrine, Scholarship, Law, Political science, Philosophy