1990•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

A NOTE ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE CASE FOR AN ACCIDENT TAX AND A SAFETY BONUS SCHEME

Paul Lanoie

Abstract

Using a fairly general principal-agent model in which both firms and workers can affect the risk of a workplace accident, this note shows theoretically that an accident tax and/or a safety bonus scheme could unambiguously reduce the incidence of workplace accidents, contrary to the ambiguous theoretical results that are obtained with safety regulations

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Key concepts: Accident (philosophy), Economic interventionism, Government (linguistics), Business, Intervention (counseling), Occupational safety and health, Principal (computer security), Scheme (mathematics)