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2003•The RAND Journal of EconomicsRequires access

The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation

Kathryn E. Spier

Open publisher page 39 citations

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Key concepts: Plaintiff, Settlement (finance), Commit, Class action, Law, Business, Law and economics, Economics

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