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2011•International Game Theory ReviewOpen access

PROCESS AND PRODUCT INNOVATION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRY

Emanuele Bacchiega, Luca Lambertini, Andrea Mantovani

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Abstract

We examine a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms invest in process and product innovation and then compete in prices under full market coverage. We show that (i) process innovation fosters (hinders) product innovation for the low-quality (high-quality) firm; (ii) the firm which is initially more efficient invests more than the rival in process innovation; (iii) if the initial differential between marginal costs is sufficiently high, the demand for the less efficient firm is nil and the duopoly equilibrium does not exist.

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What this paper is about

We examine a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms invest in process and product innovation and then compete in prices under full market coverage. We show that (i) process innovation fosters (hinders) product innovation for the low-quality (high-quality) firm; (ii) the firm which is initially more efficient invests more than the rival in process innovation; (iii) if the initial differential between marginal costs is sufficiently high, the demand for the less efficient firm is nil and the duopoly equilibrium does not exist.

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Available abstract

We examine a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms invest in process and product innovation and then compete in prices under full market coverage. We show that (i) process innovation fosters (hinders) product innovation for the low-quality (high-quality) firm; (ii) the firm which is initially more efficient invests more than the rival in process innovation; (iii) if the initial differential between marginal costs is sufficiently high, the demand for the less efficient firm is nil and the duopoly equilibrium does not exist.

Key concepts: Duopoly, Industrial organization, Product differentiation, Product innovation, Quality (philosophy), Product (mathematics), Business, Process (computing)

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