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2010•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

A ‘Reputation’ Refinement without Equilibrium

Joel Watson

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Key concepts: Mathematical economics, Repeated game, Complete information, Stackelberg competition, Stochastic game, Intuition, Sequential equilibrium, Equilibrium selection

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