Can Gender Quotas in Candidate Lists Empower Women? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
Manuel Bagues, Pamela Campa
Abstract
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Manuel Bagues, Pamela Campa
Abstract
Open-access reader
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the short- and medium-term effects of gender quotas in candidate lists using evidence from local elections in Spain. In the context of a closed list system with proportional representation, quotas were introduced in 2007 in municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants, and were extended in 2011 to municipalities with more than 3000 inhabitants. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that quotas increased the share of women in candidate lists by around 8 p.p. and among council members by 4 p.p. However, within three rounds of elections, we do not observe any significant variation in several proxies of politicians’ quality, the probability that women reach powerful positions such as party leader or mayor, or the size and composition of public finances. Overall, our analysis suggests that quotas in candidate lists fail to remove the barriers that prevent women from playing an influential role in politics.
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We provide a comprehensive analysis of the short- and medium-term effects of gender quotas in candidate lists using evidence from local elections in Spain. In the context of a closed list system with proportional representation, quotas were introduced in 2007 in municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants, and were extended in 2011 to municipalities with more than 3000 inhabitants. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that quotas increased the share of women in candidate lists by around 8 p.p. and among council members by 4 p.p. However, within three rounds of elections, we do not observe any significant variation in several proxies of politicians’ quality, the probability that women reach powerful positions such as party leader or mayor, or the size and composition of public finances. Overall, our analysis suggests that quotas in candidate lists fail to remove the barriers that prevent women from playing an influential role in politics.
Key concepts: Regression discontinuity design, Quality (philosophy), Demographic economics, Educational attainment, Discontinuity (linguistics), Affect (linguistics), Political science, Public economics