Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods: Traits, Labels and Diverse Information
Wallace E. Huffman
Abstract
Open-access reader
Wallace E. Huffman
Abstract
Open-access reader
New experimental economic methods are described and used to assess consumers' willingness to pay for food products that might be made from new transgenic and intragenic genetically modified (GM) traits. Participants in auctions are randomly chosen adult consumers in major US metropolitan areas and not college students. Food labels are kept simple and focus on key attributes of experimental goods. Diverse private information from the agricultural biotech industry (largely Monsanto and Syngenta), environmental groups (largely Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) and independent third-party information is used to construct the information treatments. Food labels and information treatments are randomized, which is a deviation from traditional lab methods. Auctions are best described as sealed bid random n-th price and not the standard Vickery 2nd price auctions. I show that participants in these experiments respond to both food labels and information treatments, but no single type of information is dominant
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
New experimental economic methods are described and used to assess consumers' willingness to pay for food products that might be made from new transgenic and intragenic genetically modified (GM) traits. Participants in auctions are randomly chosen adult consumers in major US metropolitan areas and not college students. Food labels are kept simple and focus on key attributes of experimental goods. Diverse private information from the agricultural biotech industry (largely Monsanto and Syngenta), environmental groups (largely Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) and independent third-party information is used to construct the information treatments. Food labels and information treatments are randomized, which is a deviation from traditional lab methods. Auctions are best described as sealed bid random n-th price and not the standard Vickery 2nd price auctions. I show that participants in these experiments respond to both food labels and information treatments, but no single type of information is dominant
Key concepts: Common value auction, Construct (python library), Willingness to pay, Marketing, Agricultural biotechnology, Genetically modified organism, Private information retrieval, Conjoint analysis