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2010•Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)Open access

Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information

Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala

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Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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What this paper is about

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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Available abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Key concepts: Cheap talk, Mathematical economics, Class (philosophy), Repeated game, Computer science, Information transmission, Extensive-form game, Turns, rounds and time-keeping systems in games

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