Common-sense psychology and its implications

This chapter describes the characteristics of common-sense explanations. It considers whether these explanations are of the same sort as those usually put forward in science, for example, in courses on cognition in psychology. In giving a common-sense explanation of a person&s;s behaviour, one refers to the person as being in a state such as having a particular belief or desire. These states are often called intentional states . Explanations that refer to intentional states differ in kind from explanations which refer solely to causes and effects: one damn thing after another, as some wit described it. The chapter argues that since representational accounts and intentional accounts are identical, then intentional accounts also are compatible with causal accounts of behaviour. It also proceeds to show that Tolman&s;s theory, and hence the common-sense intentional account, is compatible with an account of the animal&s;s behaviour that involves no reference to other states.