The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1917–88
Jérome Slater
Abstract
Jérome Slater
Abstract
The early history of the Zionist-Israeli conflict, from 1917 to the 1980s, is discussed. The early Zionist leaders recognized that the Palestinians had understandable reasons to resist Zionism but concluded that the need for a Jewish state outweighed the Palestinian case, leaving the Zionists no choice but to militarily defeat the Palestinians by the “iron wall” strategy. The Peel Commission and UN partition plans are explored, accepted by the Zionists only tactically until they were strong enough to expel most Palestinians from the land allotted to a Jewish state, so as to create an 80 percent Jewish majority. The rise of the PLO under Yasser Arafat is examined, along with its gradual transformation from an extremist terrorist group to its acceptance in 1988 and ever since as a proponent of a two-state compromise peace settlement. Israel’s refusal to reach such a settlement, especially before and after the 1948 and 1967 wars, is discussed.
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The early history of the Zionist-Israeli conflict, from 1917 to the 1980s, is discussed. The early Zionist leaders recognized that the Palestinians had understandable reasons to resist Zionism but concluded that the need for a Jewish state outweighed the Palestinian case, leaving the Zionists no choice but to militarily defeat the Palestinians by the “iron wall” strategy. The Peel Commission and UN partition plans are explored, accepted by the Zionists only tactically until they were strong enough to expel most Palestinians from the land allotted to a Jewish state, so as to create an 80 percent Jewish majority. The rise of the PLO under Yasser Arafat is examined, along with its gradual transformation from an extremist terrorist group to its acceptance in 1988 and ever since as a proponent of a two-state compromise peace settlement. Israel’s refusal to reach such a settlement, especially before and after the 1948 and 1967 wars, is discussed.
Key concepts: Compromise, Settlement (finance), Zionism, Judaism, Political science, Partition (number theory), State (computer science), Commission