2005RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

What You Don?t Know Can?t Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making

Ann Huff Stevens, Sewin Chan

Open publisher page 222 citations

Abstract

This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirementliterature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior isstrongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pensiondata to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. Whilevirtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, wedocument an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives ratherthan being unresponsive to any measured incentives.

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What this paper is about

This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirementliterature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior isstrongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pensiondata to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. Whilevirtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, wedocument an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives ratherthan being unresponsive to any measured incentives.

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OpenAlex reports 222 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirementliterature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior isstrongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pensiondata to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. Whilevirtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, wedocument an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives ratherthan being unresponsive to any measured incentives.

Key concepts: Incentive, Pension, Actuarial science, Pension system, Business, Economics, Labour economics, Finance

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