What You Don?t Know Can?t Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making
Ann Huff Stevens, Sewin Chan
Abstract
Open-access reader
Ann Huff Stevens, Sewin Chan
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirementliterature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior isstrongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pensiondata to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. Whilevirtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, wedocument an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives ratherthan being unresponsive to any measured incentives.
OpenAlex reports 222 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirementliterature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior isstrongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pensiondata to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. Whilevirtually all recent empirical work has relied on administrative- or employer-reported data, wedocument an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior.Well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average.In contrast, ill-informed individuals respond to their own misperceptions of the incentives ratherthan being unresponsive to any measured incentives.
Key concepts: Incentive, Pension, Actuarial science, Pension system, Business, Economics, Labour economics, Finance