Bringing an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cogito: the cogito as vérité, cognitio, propositio, and conclusio

The aim of this paper is to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes's cogito: is the cogito known by intuition or by inference?There have been several studies based on both analytical and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations.Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it appears that the previous studies have overlooked Descartes's use of words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various discourses on the cogito consistently.In this paper, I focus on the terms which Descartes uses to indicate the varied status of the cogito, such as 'haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum', 'hanc propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum', 'hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum', and so on; Descartes changes carefully the terms in each of the cogito arguments.By focusing on these terms, I try to interpret Descartes's explanations consistently.