1990Unpublished venueRequires access

Why the Combined Field Army

Carol Jackson

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

Abstract : This study examines the present day need for the Combined Field Army (ROK/US). It reviews the history of the Combined Field Army (CFA), the role it has served as a deterrent force and coalition force role model. A review of the command and control structure echeloned above the CFA is made. Shortfalls in the structure are identified and evaluated with respect to a perceived need for a ground component command subordinate to the Combined Forces Command (ROK/US). A conclusion is reached that there is a definite need for a ground component command (GCC). It is posited that a GCC would be representative of the maturation of the ROK/US military and political relationship. The study concludes with a review of the Combined Forces Command command and control structure examining closely the issues of operational control versus combatant command authority of Commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Command; Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command; and Commander U.S. Forces, Korea. It makes the recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea should have combatant command of U.S. forces in Korea and that Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command should have operational control of U.S. forces in Korea.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Abstract : This study examines the present day need for the Combined Field Army (ROK/US). It reviews the history of the Combined Field Army (CFA), the role it has served as a deterrent force and coalition force role model. A review of the command and control structure echeloned above the CFA is made. Shortfalls in the structure are identified and evaluated with respect to a perceived need for a ground component command subordinate to the Combined Forces Command (ROK/US). A conclusion is reached that there is a definite need for a ground component command (GCC). It is posited that a GCC would be representative of the maturation of the ROK/US military and political relationship. The study concludes with a review of the Combined Forces Command command and control structure examining closely the issues of operational control versus combatant command authority of Commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Command; Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command; and Commander U.S. Forces, Korea. It makes the recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea should have combatant command of U.S. forces in Korea and that Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command should have operational control of U.S. forces in Korea.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Abstract : This study examines the present day need for the Combined Field Army (ROK/US). It reviews the history of the Combined Field Army (CFA), the role it has served as a deterrent force and coalition force role model. A review of the command and control structure echeloned above the CFA is made. Shortfalls in the structure are identified and evaluated with respect to a perceived need for a ground component command subordinate to the Combined Forces Command (ROK/US). A conclusion is reached that there is a definite need for a ground component command (GCC). It is posited that a GCC would be representative of the maturation of the ROK/US military and political relationship. The study concludes with a review of the Combined Forces Command command and control structure examining closely the issues of operational control versus combatant command authority of Commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Command; Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command; and Commander U.S. Forces, Korea. It makes the recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea should have combatant command of U.S. forces in Korea and that Commander-in-chief, Combined Forces Command should have operational control of U.S. forces in Korea.

Key concepts: Combatant, Command and control, Aeronautics, Operations research, Control (management), Field (mathematics), Engineering, Political science

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Why the Combined Field Army — Research Paper | ScholarLens